This timeline provides milestones as legal rights of the accused have evolved through U.S. Supreme Court rulings.
The federal government seizes property from a man who owes it money. He argues that the lack of a hearing violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. The U.S. Supreme Court rules in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. that different processes may be legitimate in different circumstances.
To determine the constitutionality of a procedure, the Court looks at whether it violates specific safeguards in the Constitution and whether similar types of proceedings had been used historically, particularly in England. In this case, because a summary method for the recovery of debts had been used in England, the procedure is constitutional in the U.S.
In Thompson v. Utah, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that, just as in England, a jury must have 12 people when someone is charged with a serious crime.
In Ng Fung Ho v. White, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the Fifth Amendment due process clause requires the government to hold a hearing before deporting a U.S. resident who claims to be a citizen, arguing that otherwise the person is deprived of liberty, and possibly in danger of losing property and life.
A defendant who had been convicted in state court objects to having to stand trial in federal court for the same crime. In United States v. Lanza, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the double jeopardy clause was not violated because the state and federal legal systems are different government “units,” and that each can determine what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity.
In McCarthy v. Arndstein, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that a debtor testifying at his own bankruptcy hearing is allowed to refuse to answer questions because his answers might incriminate him. The Court holds that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to defendants in civil cases, not just criminal defendants, when criminal prosecution might result from the disclosure.
In Patton v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court decides that defendants can give up their right to a jury trial, and choose to have the judge alone decide their guilt or innocence. This choice must be made with the understanding of what they are giving up (that is, it must be an “intelligent” or “knowing” choice). In the federal courts and in some state courts, the prosecution and the judge also must agree not to have a jury.
In Powell v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court reverses the convictions and death sentences of nine African Americans known as the “Scottsboro Boys” because their rape trial had been held in Scottsboro, Ala. The court finds that the teens were denied their Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because they had not seen an attorney until the morning of the trial and had no chance to put on a meaningful defense.
In a second trial, the nine again are convicted, despite testimony by one of the two alleged victims, both white, that the rape never occurred. After the justices reverse those convictions because of the exclusion of African Americans from the jury, a third trial occurs. Four defendants are again convicted and a fifth pleads guilty; charges against the four others are dropped. By 1950, four of the five men will be paroled; the fifth will die in prison.
In Hirabayashi v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court says a federal law passed after Pearl Harbor that requires Japanese Americans to live in restricted areas and obey curfews does not violate their Fifth Amendment right to due process. The case revolves around the conviction of Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a Japanese American college student, who had refused to register for relocation and had violated a curfew. The Court does not address the relocation issue and instead focuses on the curfew, which it deems a necessary “protective measure.”
In United States v. White, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that a labor union under criminal investigation cannot refuse to turn over its records on the grounds of self-incrimination, explaining that the Bill of Rights was enacted to protect individuals, not organizations, from the government.
In In re Oliver, the U.S. Supreme Court overturns the conviction of a Michigan man who was convicted and sentenced during a secret grand jury hearing before a single judge. The hearing had occurred under a Michigan law allowing a single judge to hold secret grand jury proceedings. The Court does not rule on the law because it was not challenged by the defendant. Grand jury proceedings, held to decide whether to issue an indictment (confirming enough evidence exists to take a case to full trial), traditionally are conducted in private. In this case, the one-man grand jury went further when the judge also decided the defendant’s guilt and sentenced him to jail.
In Hernandez v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the exclusion of Mexican Americans from a jury, through the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges (objections to certain potential jurors serving on a jury without any specific reason), violates the 14th Amendment’s requirement that all people be treated equally.
If there has been an excessive amount of press coverage or other publicity before a defendant goes to trial, it may not be possible to find people to serve on a jury who have not prejudged the case. In Irvin v. Dowd, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that a criminal defendant is entitled to have a trial relocated to another community to make sure that the jury will be impartial.
In Swain v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court holds that prosecutors cannot use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors of a particular race (as it had ruled earlier about ethnic groups). The Court sets rules for proving that jurors have been stricken because of their race. Having few or no minority jurors is not proof enough. It is necessary to show that minority jurors in a certain community have been excluded over a series of trials or over a period of years before a constitutional violation can be found. The Court’s 1994 ruling in J.E.B v. Alabama extends this provision to sex as well as race.
A person who expresses reservations about the death penalty is not necessarily unfit to serve on a jury, the U.S. Supreme Court rules in Witherspoon v. Illinois. The Court holds that a prosecutor can “strike” a person from the jury “for cause” (that is, because of indications that the person cannot be fair) only if the potential juror cannot make an impartial decision about imposing the death penalty.
In Benton v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the double jeopardy clause represents a fundamental ideal of “our constitutional heritage,” and extends double jeopardy protection to defendants in state court trials. The justices also cite the 14th Amendment’s prohibition on state governments limiting liberty without due process. Double jeopardy, the Court rules, violates the due process rights of the accused.
Although it is not specified in the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Utah ruled in 1898 that, just as in England, a jury must have 12 people when trying someone charged with a serious crime. However, in Williams v. Florida, the Supreme Court calls a 12-member jury a “historical accident” and decides that what matters is if the jury’s size will allow it to reach a fair decision. The court finds that it makes sense to determine the jury’s size by the seriousness of the crime.
Although Kent and Winship gave juveniles in criminal cases many of the same constitutional protections as adults, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that juveniles do not have the right to a trial by jury in juvenile court.
In Apodaca v. Oregon, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that although the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous decisions for guilty verdicts in federal trials, it allows state courts to decide whether unanimity is required.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signs a military order authorizing the government to detain noncitizens suspected of terrorism, and to try them before military tribunals. Civil liberties groups criticize the order, fearing that the accused might be held indefinitely without receiving a trial, and that trials could be held in secret, without the usual rules about the kind of evidence that is admissible.
A defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, but the jury cannot reach a unanimous decision whether to sentence the defendant to death or to life in prison. By default, a life sentence is imposed. The defendant appeals his conviction and wins a retrial, but the second jury unanimously hands down a death sentence. In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that this second verdict does not violate the double jeopardy clause because the first jury’s inability to reach a unanimous verdict means that there was no official finding of the facts regarding what kind of penalty the defendant deserved. As these questions remain open at the time of the second trial, the second jury can look at the facts again.
In Garza v. Idaho, the U.S. Supreme Court says in a 6-3 ruling that attorneys cannot ignore their clients’ instructions to file appeals from criminal convictions even if the clients signed an agreement to waive appeals as part of their plea agreements. If the attorneys refuse, that is ineffective assistance of counsel.